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THE ECONOMIC PURPOSE OF THE
CONTRACT CLAUSE
David Crump*
ARTICLE I, Section 10 of the Constitution provides that no state
shall make any law "impairing the obligation of contracts."' Af-
ter a flurry of applications following ratification of the Constitu-
tion, which generally upheld contracts by striking down state-enacted
impairments, 2 this clause fell into a long era of disuse. In Stone v. Missis-
sippi, the Supreme Court held that a state was powerless to bind its regu-
latory authority so as to prevent the state from ensuring the public health,
safety, and welfare.3 This holding destroyed the effectiveness of the Con-
tract Clause, because if a state was free to change laws that otherwise
would uphold contracts, it was free to impair contractual obligations.4
Later, in Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, the Supreme Court
upheld a debtor relief act in an opinion that seemed, by its rhetoric, to
put the Contract Clause out of business.5
In the modern era, however, the clause has undergone a Renaissance.
In United States Trust Co. of New York v. New Jersey, the Supreme Court
struck down a state's attempt to impair contractual security for bonds.6
Then, in Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, the Court reinterpreted
its prior Blaisdell decision, holding that in the event of a nontrivial con-
tract impairment, state legislation could be upheld only in the event that
five important factors7 present in Blaisdell coalesced. "[T]he Contract
Clause remains part of the Constitution," said the Court, "It is not a dead
* A.B. Harvard College; J.D. University of Texas. John B. Neibel Professor of Law,
University of Houston. Part I of this Article contains a rewritten and expanded version of a
brief history written by this author and published as part of a casebook on Constitutional
Law. See David Crump et al., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw (5th ed.
2009).
1. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 10. For an excellent analysis of other aspects of the history of
the Contract Clause, see Robert Palmer, Obligations of Contracts: Intent and Distortion, 37
CASE W. RES. L. REv. 631 (1987), an article included in the symposium, The Individual
Liberties Within the Body of the Constitution.
2. E.g., Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810) (striking down Georgia legisla-
tion rescinding a land sale); Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819)
(striking down revisions of a college charter).
3. Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 819 (1880).
4. See Douglas W. Kmiec & John 0. McGinnis, The Contract Clause: A Return to the
Original Understanding, 14 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 525, 540 (1987).
5. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 447-48 (1934).
6. See U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 25 (1977).





In spite of this resurrection, the Contract Clause faces uneven interpre-
tation, and even in recent decisions, the courts are inconsistent about rec-
ognizing the purpose of the clause. 9 To this day, the opinions remain
difficult to reconcile, either with each other or with the original intent,
and recent decisions dispose of Contract Clause cases without considering
the purpose of the clause. This Article is unique in comparing the original
intent to both earlier and recent cases.
The Supreme Court's reasoning in Allied tolerates some impairments
of contract,10 but, excepting the situations in decided cases, outcomes re-
main difficult to predict. The five-factor Allied-Blaisdell test is subject to
extensive manipulation." Furthermore, a sufficiently "substantial" or
"severe" impairment, 12 as opposed to an insubstantial or trivial one that
would not trigger scrutiny under the five factors, is also difficult to recog-
nize. There is lacking a clear vision of the purpose of the Contract Clause,
and hence the application of the tests the Supreme Court has generated
fails to produce a unified theory of its meaning.
This Article begins with the history underlying the adoption of the
Contract Clause. Ascertaining legislative or constitutional intent by ex-
amination of history is a well-known aid to interpretation when textual
analysis fails to resolve ambiguity, especially for provisions that implicate
"reliance and expectation values," and therefore original intent is a par-
ticularly appropriate consideration in the interpretation of the Contract
Clause.13 In fact, portions of the history set forth here are cited in Su-
preme Court opinions, though they are used there only in limited ways. 14
The historical exposition that appears here is original to the author, and
previous writings about the Contract Clause do not develop the meaning
of the clause in this way.
After developing the history of its adoption, this Article contrasts the
economic purpose of the Contract Clause with the minority-rights orien-
tation of the Due Process Clause.15 This Article shows that the different
purposes can give different results in concrete cases. Thereafter, this Arti-
8. Allied, 438 U.S. at 241.
9. See Energy Reserves Grp. Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 454 U.S. 400 (1983);
Allied, 438 U.S. at 242; U.S. Trust, 431 U.S. at 28.
10. See infra Part III.B.
11. See, e.g., infra Part III.C. (covering Energy Reserves Group, in which the Court
interpreted the Allied-Blaisdell factors to reach a result inconsistent with the original in-
tent, Energy Reserves Grp., 459 U.S. at 410-19).
12. This kind of impairment is a threshold requirement of the Allied-Blaisdell test. See
infra Part III.B; see also Energy Reserves Grp., 459 U.S. at 410; Allied, 438 U.S. at 245-50.
13. See Larry G. Simon, The Authority of the Framers of the Constitution: Can
Originalist Interpretation Be Justified?, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1482, 1501-02 (1985).
14. E.g., Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 427-28 (1934) (empha-
sizing history that included debtor relief laws that caused the "defeat of creditors" so that
the "confidence essential to prosperous trade had been undermined and the utter destruc-
tion of credit was threatened); Allied, 438 U.S. at 245 (emphasizing the "high value" the
Framers placed on contracts, on which the parties "are entitled to rely").
15. See infra Part II.
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cle examines the application of the Contract Clause in both historic cases
and recent cases.16 In the course of this analysis, this Article notes in-
stances in which the reasoning of the courts does not mirror the economic
purposes of the Founders, as well as cases in which the reasoning seems
consistent with the original intent.' 7
The final section of this Article summarizes the author's conclusions,
which center upon a simple thesis. The Contract Clause, unlike other
parts of the Constitution with which it has occasionally been confused, is
not a protection of fairness to minority interests. Instead, it was enacted
for economic reasons. Its purpose was to preserve investor confidence
and thereby make capital more readily available by ensuring the investor
that a faithless government would not deprive him or her of the benefit of
the bargain after the risk had been run. This rationale emerges unmistak-
ably from the constitutional history, and although it does not explain all
of the decisions of the courts, it is consistent with the bulk of them. The
original Constitution was in large measure an economic document, and
although there also are important clauses guaranteeing fair treatment to
minority interests, there remain clauses, such as the Contract Clause, that
can be properly understood only if their economic purpose is kept in
mind.
I. AN INVESTOR-CONFIDENCE THEORY OF THE
CONTRACT CLAUSE: THE ORIGINAL
UNDERSTANDING
A. THE CLIMATE OF OPINION IN WHICH THE CONTRACT
CLAUSE WAS ADOPTED
Thirteen years before the adoption of the Constitution, Adam Smith
published his famous Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of
Nations.'8 This description of the "invisible hand," by which the price
system regulated production and consumption better than government
ever could, took the civilized world by storm after a brief period of gesta-
tion.'9 Within eight years, Wealth of Nations had been cited on the floor
of Parliament. 20 About the time of ratification of the Constitution, the
Prime Minister of England stood when Adam Smith entered the room
and said, "we are all your scholars." 21 As one historian put it, "all the
Western World became the world of Adam Smith." 22
Adam Smith explained the allocative function of the market.23 As one
economic historian put it, Smith showed, "First, . . . how prices are kept
16. See infra Parts III-IV.
17. See id.
18. ROBERT L. HEILBRONER, THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS: THE LIVES, TIMES, AND
IDEAS OF THE GREAT ECONOMic THINKERS 46 (3d ed. 1967).
19. Id. at 49.
20. Id. at 61.
21. Id. at 67.




from ranging arbitrarily away from the actual cost of producing a good.
Second, ... how society can induce its producers ... to provide ... what it
wants. Third, . . . why high prices are a self-curing disease, for they cause
production ... to increase." 24 Smith also explained the capital market and
the effect of risk on investment, and he made the following specific obser-
vations on the need to enforce contracts:
A defect in the law may sometimes raise the rate of interest consid-
erably above what the condition of the country, as to wealth or pov-
erty, would require. When the law does not enforce the performance
of contracts, it puts all borrowers nearly upon the same footing with
bankrupts or people of doubtful credit in better regulated countries.
The uncertainty of recovering his money makes the lender exact the
same usurious interest which is usually required from bankrupts.25
Smith's observations on the abrogation of contracts were a part of the
intellectual climate in which the Constitution was adopted thirteen years
later. Professors Tuttle and Perry asserted that acceptance of the ideas of
Adam Smith was well-nigh universal among the drafters of the Constitu-
tion.26 Economic historian Robert Heilbroner stated that Wealth of Na-
tions became "an economic blueprint" for the new American State.27
Also, Smith cited Montesquieu, who had earlier explained the premium
for uncertainty of performance that investors demand in jurisdictions
where contracts can be abrogated.28 The work of Montesquieu was famil-
iar to the Founders, who quoted him while drafting the Constitution. 29
B. DESTRUCTION OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMY BY CONTRACT
ABROGATION DURING THE ARTICLES OF
CONFEDERATION PERIOD
The drafters of the Constitution personally experienced the evils Adam
Smith and Montesquieu had written about. The American Revolution
was followed by a severe postwar depression.30 This event coincided with
the Articles of Confederation, which did not place restraints upon the
regulation of trade by individual states. 31 The principal cause of the Con-
24. Id. at 52.
25. 1 ADAM SMITH, AN INOUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 112 (1976) (emphasis added).
26. FRANK W. TUTrLE & JOSEPH M. PERRY, AN ECONOMic HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES 105 (1970). For examples of the Founders' arguments indicating understanding and
acceptance of Smith's market theory, see 2 JONATHAN ELLIOT, ELLIOT's DEBATES ON THE
CONSTITUTION 139 (2d ed. 1901) [hereinafter ELLIOT's DEBATES] (remarks of Massachu-
setts delegate Russell as to allocative effects of competitive market in "calling forth re-
sources" and regulating demand); 4 ELLIOT's DEBATES, supra, at 298 (remarks of South
Carolina delegate Mathews indicating that natural competition, rather than regulation,
would ensure against charging of "excessive freightage" by shippers).
27. HEILBRONER, supra note 18, at 37.
28. SMITH, supra note 25, at 112.
29. Id. at 112 n.33; 3 ELLIOT's DEBATES, supra note 26, at 280 (Montesquieu cited in
debate on ratification in Massachusetts).
30. TUTrLE & PERRY, supra note 26, at 105.
31. Id.
690 [Vol. 66
The Economic Purpose of the Contract Clause
stitutional Convention was the action of faithless states in trying to solve
the problems of postwar depression by allowing paper securities to be-
come worthless and by abrogating private contracts so as to benefit the
abrogating states' citizens at the expense of creditors. 32 These events
caused the Founders to echo the words of Adam Smith about the need
for contract enforcement to ensure capital availability. For example,
James Madison explained the conditions that led to the Constitutional
Convention thus:
In the internal administration of the states, a violation of contracts
had become familiar, in the form of depreciated paper made a legal
tender, of property substituted for money, of installment laws, and of
the occlusions of the courts of justice, although evident that all such
interferences affected the rights of other states, relatively creditors,
as well as citizens creditors within the state....
As a natural consequence of this distracted and disheartening condi-
tion of the Union, the federal authority had ceased to be respected
abroad.... At home, it had lost all confidence and credit; the unsta-
ble and unjust career of the states had also forfeited the respect and
confidence essential to order and good government, involving a gen-
eral decay of confidence and credit between man and man.33
The authors of the Federalist advanced similar causes: "The sober peo-
ple of America are weary of the fluctuating policy which has directed the
public councils," they wrote, destroying the economy by destroying "nec-
essary confidence" in investment. 34 They predicted that the Contract
Clause would "give a regular course to the business of society." 35
Historians have repeatedly observed that the most important concerns
underlying the original Constitution were economic. With specific refer-
ence to the Contract Clause, one commentator has written that "as long
as a strong rationalization for capitalistic power existed in economic
thought and opinion, the civil liberties and minority rights argument was
secondary."36 Another economic historian, Charles Beard, explained the
conditions that gave rise to the Contract Clause by referring to the clash
of interests of mercantilists (interested in protecting personality and
trade) and agrarians (interested in protecting land):
Equally important to personalty as the positive powers conferred
upon Congress . . . were the restrictions imposed on the States. In-
deed, we have the high authority of Madison . . . that of the forces
which created the Constitution, those property interests seeking pro-
tection against omnipotent [State] legislatures were the most active.
32. See CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES 180 (1956); TUTrLE & PERRY, supra note 26, at 106.
33. 5 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 26, at 120.
34. THE FEDERALIST No. 44 (James Madison).
35. Id.; BEARD, supra note 32, at 180.




Two small clauses embody the chief demands of personalty against
agrarianism: the emission of paper money is prohibited and the
states are forbidden to impair the obligation of contract.... [M]oney
lenders and security holders may be sure of their operations. Con-
tracts are to be safe, and whoever engages in a financial operation,
public or private, may know that state legislatures cannot destroy
overnight the rules by which the game is played.37
Beard added, "A principle of deep significance is written in these two
brief sentences. The economic history of the states between the Revolu-
tion and the adoption of the Constitution is compressed in them."38
C. THE DEBATE IN THE CONVENTION: ECONOMIC CONCERNS
Debate on the Contract Clause in the Constitutional Convention was
not extensive. However, such debate as there was shows that inclusion of
the clause was motivated by the economic concerns mentioned by
Madison. The delegates had recognized the harm to investment caused by
insecure money, and they realized that the States could create the same
kinds of harm by abrogating contracts. Records of the debates show the
following:
Aug. 28 Article XII [predecessor to Section 10] being taken up:
Mr. Wilson [and] Mr. Sherman moved to insert after the words
"coin money" the words "nor emit bills of credit, nor make any thing
but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts."
Mr. Sherman thought this a favorable crisis for crushing paper
money....
Mr. King moved to add ... a prohibition on the states to interfere
with private contracts.
Mr. Govr. Morris. This would be going too far. There are a thou-
sand laws relating to bringing actions-limitations of actions [and]
which affect contracts. . . ; a majority must rule, whatever may be the
mischief done among themselves.
Mr. Sherman. Why then prohibit bills of credit?
Mr. Wilson was in favor of Mr. King's motion.
Mr. Madison admitted that inconveniences might arise from such a
prohibition but thought on the whole it would be overbalanced by
the utility of it.39
It can thus be seen that the Contract Clause immediately followed the
State Money Clause in the debate, and that the delegates who had pro-
posed the State Money Clause (Wilson and Sherman) immediately spoke
for the Contract Clause, regarding them as similarly motivated to protect
37. BEARD, supra note 32, at 178-80.
38. Id. at 179.
39. 2 MAX FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 439-40;
see also Gov'T PRINTING OFFICE, DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE FORMATION OF THE
UNION OF THE AMERICAN STATEs 627-34 (1965).
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investment ("Why then prohibit bills of credit?"). 40 The debate then
turned to other economic issues-including embargoes, imposts, duties
on imports, the taxing power, the general commerce power, and bank-
ruptcy-and returned to the Contract Clause to refer it to the committee
on Style the following day.41
When Section 10 was adopted by the Convention a few days later, the
only recorded comment was that of delegate Gerry of Massachusetts,
who "entered into observations inculcating the importance of public
faith, and the propriety of the restraint put on the States from impairing
the obligation of contracts-Alleging that Congress ought to be laid
under the like prohibitions. . . . He was not 2ded." 42
On the day of its adoption, as earlier, the Contract Clause was sur-
rounded by, and related to, debate on other economic issues. Given the
context and the history, it is clear that Gerry's reference to "public faith"
meant confidence in the enforcement of contracts that would produce
venture capital.
D. DEBATES ON RATIFICATION: CONCERN ABOUT CREDIT, CAPITAL,
INTEREST RATES, AND FOREIGN DEBT
In those states in which the Contract Clause was actually debated dur-
ing ratification, the purpose of the clause clearly emerged as that of pro-
tecting the availability of capital in a free economy. For example, Charles
Pinckney, one of the drafters of the Constitution and South Carolina's
foremost spokesman, began his remarks supporting ratification by decry-
ing the "loss of credit" resulting from the "inefficacy of the Confedera-
tion."43 He attributed the calling of the Convention to the "destruction of
commerce, of public credit, private confidence and national charac-
ter .... ."44 Thereafter, he spoke directly in support of the Contract Clause,
as follows:
This section I consider as the soul of the Constitution....
Henceforth, the citizens of the states may trade with each other
without fear of tender-laws or laws impairing the nature of contracts.
The citizen of South Carolina will be able to trade with those of
Rhode Island, North Carolina, and Georgia, and be sure of receiving
the value of his commodities. Can this be done at present? It
cannot!
But above all, how much will this section tend to restore your
credit with foreigners . . . ! No more shall paper money, no more
shall tender-laws, drive their commerce from our shores, and darken
the American name in every country where it is known. No more
40. FARRAND, supra note 39, at 439-40.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 619.
43. 4 ELLIOT's DEBATES, supra note 26, at 253. This subject matter was the opening
point and focus of debate in South Carolina.
44. Id. at 255.
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shall our citizens conceal in their coffers those treasures which the
weakness and dishonesty of our government have long hidden from
the public eye.. . . Public as well as private confidence shall again be
established; industry shall return among us. . . 45
In Pennsylvania, a legislator who had also been a Convention delegate
supported the Contract Clause by arguing that its absence had caused
paper to pass at a "twenty-five or thirty [percent] discount" in a neighbor-
ing state.46 Similarly, in North Carolina and Virginia, the Contract Clause
was viewed as having the purpose of safeguarding investment.47
In states in which the Contract Clause was not directly mentioned, the
need for protection of capital emerged as a foremost concern. For exam-
ple, in Massachusetts, one delegate supported limitations on the powers
of the States by the following argument: "Our credit is reduced to so low
an ebb, that American faith is a proverbial expression for perfidy, as Pu-
nic faith was among the Romans. Thus have we suffered every species of
infamy abroad, and poverty at home."48
The interest that American states were made to pay to procure loans in
Europe, owing to abrogations of contract, was a frequent point in the
ratification debates. Thus in Connecticut, one delegate argued that State
abrogation of contracts had driven America to "the wretched expedient
of negotiating new loans in Europe," at higher interest, "to pay the inter-
est of the foreign debt."49 He predicted the inability of the nation to raise
new money even to pay for "an ox" if such contractual debts were
abrogated.50
Finally, Alexander Hamilton pointed out that "private credit" was dif-
ficult to obtain in some states, including New York.51 He attributed this
failure of capital to the tendency of states to "throw off their burdens of
government upon their neighbors." 52 If private capital was available, said
Hamilton, it was "retained by its holders; but nothing more than stability
and confidence in the government is requisite to draw it into circula-
tion."53 He also observed that the interest rate for foreign debt "should
strike us with shame," and he warned prophetically that this debt would
"one day endanger the peace of our country." 54
The Federalist Papers, which were enormously influential in securing
ratification, emphasized the private capital that would flow from the Con-
tract Clause.55 Newspapers engaged in "not a little discussion of the obli-
45. 4 ELLIOT's DEBATES, supra note 26, at 333-36.
46. ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 26, at 486.
47. See 4 ELLorr's DEBATES, supra note 26, at 191 (North Carolina); 3 ELLIOT'S DE-
BATES, supra note 26, at 478 (Virginia).
48. ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 26, at 143-44.
49. Id. at 188-89.
50. Id. at 189.




55. THE FEDERALIST No. 44 (James Madison); BEARD, supra note 32, at 180.
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gation of the contract clause ... during the period of ratification ... as an
added safeguard" for investment. 56 In this atmosphere, the Constitution
was adopted.
E. CASE AUTHORITY INTERPRETING THE CONTRACT CLAUSE:
FIDELITY TO ITS ECONOMIC PURPOSES
The early Contract Clause cases were authored by John Marshall, one
of the delegates to the Convention and a strong believer in the economic
function of the clause. He gave the following statement of its purposes:
We cannot look back to the history of the times when the august
spectacle was exhibited of the assemblage of a whole people by their
representatives in Convention .. . without being sensible of the great
importance .. . attached to the tenth section of the first Article. The
power of changing the relative situation of debtor and creditor, of
interfering with contracts, a power which comes home to every man
[and] touches the interest of all, . . . had been used to such an excess
by the State legislatures as to break in upon the ordinary intercourse
of society, and destroy all confidence between man and man. The
mischief had become so great, so alarming, as not only to impair
commercial intercourse, and threaten the existence of credit, but to
sap the morals of the people, and destroy the sanctity of private
faith. To guard against the continuance of the evil ... was one of the
important benefits expected from a reform of the government.57
II. ULTIMATE PURPOSES: ECONOMICS OR FAIRNESS?
When a court considers a case involving one of the economic protec-
tions of the Constitution, it must decide whether the objective of the pro-
vision is economic in nature or whether it is to guarantee fairness.58 The
attribution of the particular clause to one or the other of these policies
makes a big difference. Offhand, it might seem that the affected person
would be better treated by a fairness approach, but paradoxically, this is
not the case. Economic interests are more seriously protected by an eco-
nomic approach than an orientation toward fairness.59
The Due Process Clause is the prototype of a provision with a fairness
objective. 60 This clause can be said to provide some degree of economic
protection, since it protects "property" from deprivation without due pro-
cess.61 But as every beginning student of constitutional law knows, the
substantive protection that the Due Process Clause provides to economic
56. BEARD, supra note 32, at 180.
57. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 354-55 (1827).
58. David Crump, Takings by Regulation: How Should Courts Weigh the Balancing
Factors?, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1, 21-25 (2012).
59. For an explanation of this principle, see id. at 23-25 (comparing fairness purposes
as a basis of the Takings Clause with economic purposes, which provide greater security to
investors).
60. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 343 (1976) (describing relevance of
"fairness and reliability" to consideration of laws under the Due Process Clause).
61. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV.
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activity is minimal. The state complies with the Due Process Clause if it
can articulate a "rational basis" for its regulation, or if it can argue, even
after enactment on the basis of considerations never advanced before,
that its law economically disadvantaging the complaining citizen is "rea-
sonably related" to a "legitimate state interest." 62 A regulation that im-
pairs economic interests is constitutional unless it is arbitrary.63 This
standard is one of the lowest barriers to be found in constitutional
doctrine.
The application of this standard to a regulation of contracts will usually
allow the regulation to impair contracts. In other words, it will make the
Contract Clause a dead letter. Imagine, for example, an investor whose
foresight pays off and entitles him to a healthy gain. The investor's new-
found wealth creates envy or resentment, however, in those who are not
so fortunate, especially if their economic situation is such that it is the
investor's gain that makes them less well-off. This perception of fairness
is especially likely to prevail if the investor's gains are unpredictable in
amount but turn out to create value in excess of non-investors' guesses; in
other words, successful oil and gas operations 64 or pharmaceutical devel-
opment 65 will often produce populist demands for relief from investors'
expectations. It seems "fair," in those situations, to shave away some of
the investor's gain and to restore it to those who otherwise would gain
less from the transaction. Fairness, in other words, does not protect the
investor's right to the benefit of the bargain. And if a court looks to the
Due Process Clause, it will see that this clause does not affect a regulation
that lessens the investor's gain in order to transfer wealth to those who
otherwise would gain less, because there is a rational basis for the con-
tractual impairment. The law may take something away from the inves-
tor, but it does so in a way reasonably related to a legitimate state
purpose, because it helps to promote equality by giving back to the losers
what they have contracted to pay.6 6
An economic focus would view this case differently. Economic pur-
poses are served by assuring the investor the gains received from the
transaction. This outcome leads to investor confidence. As a result, it en-
courages investment, and it provides credit at more reasonable costs. 6 7
62. See DAVID CRUMP ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
349-53, 567-73 (5th ed. 2009) (providing explanations and excerpting cases about the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses).
63. See id. at 572.
64. See, e.g., Energy Reserves Grp. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 415-16
(1983) (upholding a law that impaired pricing clauses in gas contracts).
65. Cf William H. Lash, Price Caps on Prescription Drugs is Bad Medicine, Hous.
CHRONICLE, Jan. 21, 2000, at 39A (describing efforts of the Clinton administration to im-
pose price controls; arguing that controls would "dim economic incentives and kill
innovation").
66. Cf Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 487-91 (1955) (using rational basis
test to uphold a law imposing economic losses on some for benefit of others). "It is enough
that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the particular
legislative measure was a rational way to correct it." Id.
67. See supra Part I.
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The losers in the transaction can, if the democracy so desires, be assisted
or even restored to neutral or even profitable outcomes through subsidies
achieved by the tax-and-transfer system.68 Usually, this mechanism does
not interfere with investor confidence, and it generally does not discour-
age investment or drive up interest rates.69 But as the preconstitutional
history shows, there is a shortsighted tendency for legislatures to avoid
the democratic effects of this course of action and instead achieve the
result by impairing contracts.70 An economic interpretation of the Con-
tract Clause would prohibit this solution.
There can be little question which of these two purposes the Founders
had in mind when they adopted the Contract Clause. As the preceding
Part of this Article shows, a philosophy of original intent would attribute
an economic purpose to the clause: a policy of reassuring investors.71 The
court decisions, however, are inconsistent. Sometimes the reasoning is
that of fairness rather than economics. Sometimes, unfortunately, the
courts have even cited Due Process Clause cases-while interpreting the
Contract Clause. 72 This approach is counterproductive, because the Due
Process Clause will usually uphold even the kinds of contract impair-
ments that are the core concern of the Contract Clause.73 This is not to
say that every retroactive regulation would be regarded as unconstitu-
tional under an economic analysis. 74 The point is only that investor pro-
tection is the proper focus, and if a particular lessening of the gains of a
given investor is not of a kind that will decrease investor confidence gen-
erally, it is not unconstitutional under an economic approach. The point,
therefore, is that a regulation of contract is judged consistently with the
original intent if an economic purpose-a policy of investor protection-
is the basis by which it is considered.
The structure of the Contract Clause that is created by its grammar and
expression is fundamentally different from that of more flexible provi-
sions such as the Due Process Clause.75 Due process requires a balancing
process of some kind to determine its meaning, because it is not a cate-
gorical prohibition of denial of life, liberty, or property; it allows interfer-
ence with autonomy if the interference is accomplished consistently with
68. Cf DAVID CRUMP, How To REASON ABOUT THE LAW: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY
APPROACH TO THE FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC POLICY (2001) (comparing contract impair-
ment by price controls to tax-and-transfer systems).
69. Cf id. (suggesting superiority of tax-and-transfer systems).
70. See supra Part I.
71. See id.
72. See, e.g., Energy Reserves Grp. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 412
(1983) (deciding Contract Clause case with aid of a citation from a Due Process decision,
namely, Cities Serv. Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179, 185 (1950)).
73. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
74. For example, see infra Part III.D, for an analysis of Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S.
516 (1982), which upheld the destruction of contractually created interests but arguably
was consistent with the original intent of the Contract Clause.
75. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) ("[D]ue process is
flexible . . . .").
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the "process that is due." 76 The Contract Clause, on the other hand, is
categorical, and it enacts a flat prohibition of contract impairment. Fur-
thermore, the Due Process Clause is general in scope, applying to all reg-
ulations of whatever kind, whereas the Contract Clause is narrow and
specific, applying only to contracts. This structure does not mean that the
Contract Clause is absolute,77 but it does mean that it should be read
differently from a provision expressing an explicit balancing.
III. COMPARING THE DECISIONS TO
THE ORIGINAL INTENT
Some of the judicial decisions are consistent with the original intent,
some are not, and some are in between. Decisions that result in impairing
contracts, it should be added, are not uniformly contrary to the Founders'
purpose.78 The issue is whether the decisions adequately protect inves-
tors. If a particular outcome does not threaten investor confidence even
though it contravenes contractual expectations, it may be consistent with
the original intent. Also, no clause of the Constitution is absolute, and the
Contract Clause needs to be read in context.
Some of the early decisions fail in obvious ways to carry out the
Founder's intentions. A holding that no state can surrender its power
over the welfare of its citizens, for example, is contrary to the original
intent, because if there is a change of law from a position allowing a given
contract to a position impairing it, the change may very well be defensible
as a protection of citizen welfare, but it also may undermine investor con-
fidence.79 Other decisions are not so easy to characterize.
A. HOME BUILDING & LOAN AssoCIATION V. BLAISDELL:
FORECLOSURE MORATORIA IN RESPONSE TO A DEPRESSION
In Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell, the state's regula-
tion responded to the Great Depression.80 It retroactively enacted a mor-
atorium on mortgage foreclosures. 81 This enactment ostensibly impaired
contract expectations, because it meant that a mortgagee who had ob-
tained the agreement of a mortgagor to mortgage foreclosure under de-
fined conditions could not lawfully foreclose, in spite of the existence of
the conditions that the parties had agreed would permit foreclosure.82 It
is possible to read Blaisdell as inconsistent with investor protection. An
76. See DAVID CRUMP ET AL., supra note 62, at 450 (considering "what process is
due").
77. See Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 240 (1978) (stating that
although the clause "appears unambiguously absolute," it is not such a "Draconian" provi-
sion, and it cannot be read with excessive "literalism").
78. Cf infra Parts III.D., IV.A. (analyzing Texaco and Automobile Workers, both of
which impaired contracts in ways that did not violate the original intent).
79. Cf supra note 3 and accompanying text (analyzing Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S.
814 (1880)).
80. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 380, 476 (1934).
81. Id. at 415-19.
82. Id. at 418-19.
698 [Vol. 66
The Economic Purpose of the Contract Clause
investor who perceives the possibility that such a moratorium may be
lawfully imposed will correctly see that the investor autonomy created by
the contract arrangement is impaired. The enactment at issue in Blaisdell,
therefore, leaves the investor with less than was contracted for, and it
does so after the contract has become operational and the investor has
run the risks of the contract.83
But perhaps there is another way to view the moratorium. As enacted,
it responded to a situation in which many, if not most, debtors were una-
ble to pay according to their contracts. 84 The moratorium did not extin-
guish any debt; it merely delayed the requirement of its payment.85
Furthermore, the delay was temporary and limited to what was seen as
necessary to provide for the possibility of payment. 86 It is conceivable, in
such a situation, that a moratorium may protect investors generally, as
opposed to individual investors, by enhancing the probability that repay-
ment will become more likely, or at least that foreclosure sale prices may
rise, by reason of a delay that puts the possibility of sale into another time
when economic conditions may not be so bad. Without a moratorium, the
strategy of individual investors will be to foreclose as early as is feasible,
and this strategy conceivably benefits a few who act quickly and force-
fully, but it may disadvantage the many who act more cautiously or who,
for whatever reason, are unable to foreclose early-including those
whose debtors are more financially able to respond and those who work
with their debtors. By this reasoning, the Blaisdell decision does not un-
dermine investor confidence and is consistent with the original intent. On
the other hand, it is possible that a moratorium of this kind will not have
beneficial effects, or that it will result in a wealth transfer from investors
to borrowers. This possibility indicates a way to reach the conclusion that
Blaisdell is inconsistent with the original intent.
In summary, someone keeping a box score that evaluates achievement
of the original intent by different decisions will have to consider Blaisdell
carefully. It is somewhere in the middle. Probably, the evaluation de-
pends upon how predictably faithful the Blaisdell criteria will induce the
courts to be, in considering whether a particular contract interference im-
pairs investor confidence. If Blaisdell results in a regime in which inves-
tors foresee that courts will surrender to populist demands for contract
impairment, the decision will contravene the original intent. If, on the
other hand, investors perceive the Blaisdell criteria as leading the courts
to allow moratoria only rarely, and only in situations in which arguments
indicate that advantages to nearly all are likely to follow, including for
most investors, then the decision will be consistent with the original
intent.
83. Id. at 423.
84. Id. at 421-24.




B. ALLIED STRUCTURAL STEEL COMPANY V. SPANNAUS:
RETROACTIVE CHANGING OF PENSION OBLIGATIONS
The Allied87 decision applied the Blaisdell decision in a way that
seemed to promise something of a return to the original intent, even if
not perfectly so. The regulation in question had retroactively altered the
pension obligations of some employers by requiring them to fund larger
payments than they had agreed to make.88 The Court included a state-
ment of the purpose of the Contract Clause, and its expression correctly
reflected the original intent by saying that the policy was one of protect-
ing reliance interests in personal and business affairs. 89 Its treatment of
the state statute at issue arguably carried out this purpose.
The Court set up a two-stage method for Contract Clause analysis that
endures to this day,90 even though arguably it has at times been misinter-
preted. 91 The first question, said the Court, was whether there was a "se-
vere" impairment of contract. 92 The severity of an impairment was to be
viewed from the standpoint of the complaining contracting party, or in
other words, as the interference would be viewed by an investor.93 If the
impairment was not severe, the Constitution apparently would not help
the investor; non-severe impairments were to be tolerated. If the impair-
ment was severe, the second stage was more complex.94 Then, the Court
was to consider five factors that the Court saw as important to the Blais-
dell decision.95 These criteria included, first, a legislative finding of an
emergency; second, a legislative purpose to "protect a basic societal inter-
est [rather than] a favored group"; third, "relief [that] was appropriately
tailored to the emergency that it was designed to meet"; fourth, "condi-
tions [that] were reasonable"; and fifth, a duration limited to the time of
the emergency.96
The Court concluded, first, that the impairment was severe.97 It did so
partly by considering the absolute amount of the additional dollars that
the company would be required to spend, as well as considering the ex-
tent to which the change upset the company's expectations. 98 Second, the
enactment failed to conform to the Blaisdell factors.99 There was no
showing of an emergency, and there was no general social problem to
which the law was directed, because the enactment merely increased the
87. Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 242-43 (1978).
88. Id. at 236-39.
89. Id. at 245.
90. Id. at 244-47 (describing the first stage); id. at 247-50 (describing the multi-factor
second stage).
91. See, e.g., discussion infra Part 11I.C. (analyzing the Energy Reserves Group case).
92. See Allied, 438 U.S. at 244.
93. See id. at 246-47 (analyzing severity by unexpected impact on the company).
94. See id. at 245.
95. Id. at 242.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 246.
98. Id. at 246-47.
99. Id. at 248-49.
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amounts owed to certain select employees.100 It was sudden, unantici-
pated, and difficult to plan for; this factor apparently demonstrated to the
Court a lack of tailoring to the conditions the law was designed to ad-
dress. 01 It did not operate in an area of economic endeavor that was
already heavily regulated, and the Court evidently considered this feature
in evaluating the reasonableness of the law. 1 0 2 Finally, it was not tempo-
rary or limited in duration to the time of any emergency.103
This decision brought the Allied-Blaisdell criteria to greater consistency
with the original intent of the Contract Clause than had existed after
Blaisdell alone. The Court made a point of adding that the Contract
Clause "remains part of the Constitution. It is not a dead letter," 1 0 4 al-
though it had been widely viewed as that during the time between Blais-
dell and Allied. 05 But the Court's conformity to the original intent was
incomplete. In terms of its rhetoric, the opinion emphasized that the Con-
tract Clause did not "obliterate the police powers of the States," a state-
ment that, in context, seemed to encourage contract impairments.106 And
the opinion introduced its discussion of the Blaisdell factors with the rela-
tively weak endorsement that the clause "must be understood to impose
some limits upon the power of a State."' 07 In terms of its principal hold-
ing, the two-stage analysis provided enough ambiguity to allow the up-
holding even of a contract impairment that seriously undermined investor
confidence by a court that happened to be so inclined.108 The "severity"
of a contract impairment is in the eye of the beholder, and the five sec-
ond-stage criteria are manipulable.
C. ENERGY RESERVES GRouP v. KANSAS POWER & LIGHT
COMPANY: DENYING INVESTORS THE BENEFIT
OF THEIR BARGAIN
If Allied had signaled a Renaissance of the earlier dead letter of the
Contract Clause, Energy Reserves Group'09 effected a reburial. The in-
vestors whose contracts were impaired were natural gas producers whose
contracts with a utility company contained escalation clauses that in-
creased prices along with rising markets,"10 clauses that were widely, if
100. Id. at 248-50.
101. Id. at 249-50.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 250.
104. Id. at 241.
105. See id. at 241 & n.12 (quoting a commentary to the effect that during that time
period, results would be the same if the Contract Clause "were dropped out of the
Constitution").
106. Id. at 241.
107. Id. at 242.
108. See id. at 246-48.
109. See Energy Reserves Grp. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400 (1983).
110. Id. at 403-05.
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not universally, parts of natural gas contracts.11' The contracts at issue
were made for sales within the intrastate market,112 covering only gas
produced in Kansas and sold in Kansas. This inside-the-state aspect of the
contracts was important, because although the federal government regu-
lated interstate sales of gas according to a complicated system that sup-
pressed prices," 3 it did not regulate intrastate prices during the time
period at issue.114 The intrastate market was a favorite of investors be-
cause it reflected market prices more accurately, and likewise, it was a
favorite of consumers because the operation of market forces meant ade-
quate supply with fewer interruptions than the interstate market had ex-
perienced.115 Nevertheless, in response to rising prices, the Kansas
legislature enacted the Kansas Natural Gas Price Protection Act, which
limited the operation of escalation clauses in producers' contracts with
buyers.116
The Supreme Court upheld the Act. The Court avoided direct analysis
of the first Allied-Blaisdell issue by saying that although Energy Reserves
Group could have anticipated the possibility of federal regulatory
changes that occurred, it could not have expected the magnitude of the
higher prices that its price escalators would produce." 7 This observation
seems odd, since that was the purpose of the escalators. The Court transi-
tioned to the second stage by observing that "[t]o the extent, if any, [that]
the Kansas Act impairs ERG's contractual interests," it was justified by
countervailing interests.'18 It ignored the criterion of an "emergency,"
saying only that the Act would cause "hardship."1 9 The "tailoring" crite-
rion also underwent reinterpretation, with the Court saying, instead, that
the means chosen to implement the Act were not "deficient."1 2 0 The
Court conceded that prices in the interstate market had never been regu-
lated, and this fact should have made the Court consider, as in Allied,
whether the new regulation was unanticipated; but the Court sidestepped
that conclusion by saying that the state had regulated gas production in
111. See generally David Crump, Natural Gas Price Escalation Clauses: A Legal and
Economic Analysis, 70 MiNN. L. REv. 61 (1985) (describing and analyzing these clauses,
which "usually" appear in these contracts).
112. See Energy Reserves Grp., 459 U.S. at 408 (indicating that the subject was intra-
state gas).
113. See Crump, supra note 111, at 68-75 (describing the federal regulatory system).
114. The Natural Gas Policy Act extended federal price controls to the intrastate mar-
ket in 1978, but the sales at issue remained unregulated by federal authorities because they
had been contracted before that time. Energy Reserves Grp., 459 U.S. at 406-07.
115. Id. at 414 & n.19 (describing how gas tended to be "diverted to the intrastate
market" because buyers "were willing to pay higher prices." Stripped of its pejorative rhet-
oric, this verbiage means that both producers and consumers preferred pricing set by mar-
ket forces rather than by regulations forcing it below market so that supply met demand
and shortages were avoided.).
116. Id. at 407.
117. Id. at 415-16.
118. Id. at 416-17.
119. Id. at 417.
120. Id. at 418.
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other ways. 121 Finally, the Court did not consider whether the Act was
limited in duration to any emergency, but instead, it said that the effects
of the Act would decrease in tandem with federal regulations, which were
of uncertain duration.122
Energy Reserves Group is inconsistent with the original intent. The
Court implicitly assumed that the price impairment to investors was triv-
ial, or that there was something about price escalation that was unimpor-
tant to them. On the contrary, price escalation clauses were virtually
universal in gas contracts, and they were heavily negotiated.123 Producers
who sold gas on long-term contracts traded later escalation, in effect, for
lower initial prices.124 If prices were to be uniform throughout the term of
a twenty-year contract, a rational producer would insist on a very high
price in the first years.125 The Court's application of the Allied-Blaisdell
factors was not faithful to those decisions, and it shows how incompletely
Allied conformed to the original intent.
D. OTHER CASES: MIXED RESULTS IN SERVING
THE ORIGINAL INTENT
In Texaco Inc. v. Short, the Supreme Court upheld the Indiana Dor-
mant Mineral Interests Act.126 This law provided that an undeveloped
severed mineral estate (such as an oil and gas interest that was owned by
someone who did not own the surface) would lapse after twenty years
unless preserved by certain publicly filed documents.127 Thus, the mineral
estate would disappear, because it would be merged with the surface es-
tate. 128 The motivation for the Act was prevention of the fragmentation
of estates by transfers or inheritances, which caused small estate interests
to proliferate, and in turn impeded development as well as administration
by producers who paid royalties.129 The owner of a lapsed estate filed suit
on the claim that the Act impaired the contract for purchase of the
estate.130
Paradoxically, this decision seems consistent with the original purpose
of the Contract Clause, even though it resulted in the complete loss of the
property right created by the impaired contract. A focus upon the protec-
tion of investors reduces the apparent paradox. An investor would be
unlikely to seek to acquire an ordinary mineral estate in the first place if
the investor had no intention of developing it within twenty years, be-
cause the present value of production more than twenty years from now
121. Id. at 413-14.
122. Id. at 418.
123. See Crump, supra note 111, at 61-63 and cited authority.
124. See Superior Oil Co. v. W. Slope Gas Co., 549 F. Supp. 463, 471 (D. Colo. 1982)
(citing testimony of the author of this Article).
125. See generally Crump, supra note 111, at 75-76 (explaining this tradeoff).
126. Texaco Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 518 (1982).
127. Id. at 518-19.
128. Id. at 541.
129. Id. at 523.
130. Id. at 522-23.
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probably would be small in relation to the present investment.131 For the
unusual transaction in which an investor might do so, the investment
could be protected easily by the filing of a document. It seems unlikely
that these consequences would discourage purchasers of mineral estates.
On the other hand, United States Trust Company of New York v. New
Jersey involved the states' impairments of their own contracts.132 U.S.
Trust Company sued as a trustee and holder of New York Port Authority
Bonds, on the ground that state statutes passed by New York and New
Jersey impaired the contracted-for security for the bonds, which had been
arranged by the contract of sale of the bonds.133 As part of the bond
transaction, the two states had set up a covenant limiting the power of the
Port Authority to use revenues to subsidize passenger transportation.13 4
The statutes at issue repealed this covenant and authorized use of reve-
nues for passenger subsidies, thus reducing their availability to secure the
bonds. 35 The Court held that the statutes violated the Contract Clause
because the states' promise was "purely financial and thus not necessarily
a compromise of the State's reserved powers."1 36
United States Trust was decided before Allied, and it did not rely on the
Allied-Blaisdell factors. Its primary meaning seems to be that the state
cannot easily abrogate its own contracts, at least not financially related
contracts, as opposed to contracts between private persons.'37 But the
Contract Clause was motivated by preferences for in-state citizens, not
merely contracts made between citizens and states.'38 The decision con-
tains the usual recognition of the police power of the state, and it distin-
guishes contracts involving taxing and spending powers, which the states
effectively can agree to, and contracts impairing the police or eminent-
domain powers, which it says are "invalid ab initio."139 United States
Trust therefore adds to the protection of investors only in a limited area.
It did, however, provide an introduction to the subject that may have
helped persuade the Court to consider the Allied case.
IV. CURRENT CASES
The Contract Clause continues to be an important source of disputes,
including disputes of major proportions: disputes that affect many people
and institutions. But the recent cases do not always consider the purpose
of the clause. This is unfortunate, because the original intent could be an
131. Cf CRUMP, supra note 68, at 165 (explaining finance theory of present value of
future payments by an example: a $50,000 payment twenty years from today is worth only
$7,432, not $50,000, assuming a 10 percent rate of return).
132. See 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
133. Id. at 3-8.
134. Id. at 9-11.
135. Id. at 12-14.
136. Id. at 25.
137. Cf id. at 23-24 (suggesting a difference between public and private contracts, so
that the state's own contract is harder for it to abrogate, at least for financial reasons).
138. See supra Part I.B-D.
139. U.S. Trust, 431 U.S. at 23-24.
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important aid to interpretation of the clause in some of these cases, and
the Supreme Court's past decisions have used and even emphasized it.
A. UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACE, [AND] AGRICULTURAL
IMPLEMENT WORKERS V. FORTUNO: DOES ABROGATING A
PUBLIC EMPLOYEE UNION AGREEMENT VIOLATE
THE CONTRACr CLAUSE?
In United Automobile Workers, national and local labor unions as well
as public-employee members of unions brought an action against the gov-
ernor of Puerto Rico, alleging that a legislative enactment to deal with an
economic crisis violated the Contract Clause, among other constitutional
provisions.140 The enactment was entitled the "Law Declaring a Fiscal
State of Emergency and Establishing a Comprehensive Fiscal Stabiliza-
tion Plan to Save Puerto Rico Credit."141 Among its provisions was a
plan to reduce the government payroll.142 Phase One of this plan was "a
'permanent workday reduction program' for certain senior employees,"
coupled with incentives for voluntary resignations.14 3 Phase Two, which
was conditioned upon a failure of Phase One to produce complete suc-
cess, would include involuntary layoffs.144 Phase Three suspended a vari-
ety of "statutory, contractual, and other provisions governing" working
conditions of public employees, including provisions of collective-bar-
gaining agreements that covered pay, promotion, demotion, work force
reductions, and other aspects of public positions.'4 5
The court upheld the dismissal of the complaint.146 This aspect of the
case makes analysis difficult, because the holding purported to be based
upon an inadequacy of the allegations in the complaint, although it obvi-
ously was nonetheless a ruling on the merits of the Contract Clause is-
sue.147 Without considering what the Allied opinion had said about the
purpose of the Contract Clause, the court applied the five Allied-Blaisdell
factors in the second stage of the analysis under those decisions.148 The
opinion assumes, without deciding, that the impairment of contract rights
was substantial,149 so that the five criteria of the second stage were the
deciding factors. The allegations of the complaint, said the court, did not
establish that there was no "important governmental purpose" support-
ing the enactment.150 Furthermore, the allegations did not contradict Pu-
140. United Auto., Aerospace, Agric. Implement Workers of Am. Int'l Union v. For-





145. Id. at 39-40.
146. Id.
147. See generally id. at 40-41.
148. See id. at 45.




erto Rico's assertion of the "reasonableness and necessity" of the law. 151
This approach, said the court, would not inhibit meritorious Contract
Clause claims.152 A plaintiff asserting that there was a lack of an impor-
tant government purpose could allege facts showing that the impact of
the enactment was limited and of assistance only to a select few.153 A
plaintiff asserting that the law was not reasonable or necessary could al-
lege facts showing that it "did not save the state much money, [that] the
budgetary issues were not as severe as alleged by the state, or that other
cost-cutting or revenue-increasing measures were reasonable alternatives
to the contractual impairment at issue." 154
This analysis, unfortunately, fails to protect the purposes of the Con-
tract Clause, even though the result is defensible. The court watered
down the Allied-Blaisdell factors in ways that made them barely recogniz-
able and much easier for an overreaching state to satisfy. An "important
public purpose" is a far lesser requirement than an "emergency," which is
what Allied and Blaisdell suggested was required,155 as well as what Pu-
erto Rico asserted. 156 "Reasonableness and necessity" are aspects of the
Allied-Blaisdell factors, but they are supplemented in those decisions by
requirements of tailoring and temporary duration,157 which the Automo-
bile Workers court did not emphasize.
Perhaps the court could have reached the same result by considering
whether the contracts at issue were of the kind that the Contract Clause
was intended to protect; and, if it had done so, it could have minimized
the damage its holding might do to the original purpose. If investor pro-
tection is the object of the Contract Clause, it seems unlikely that the
union contracts at issue in Automobile Workers were the kind of agree-
ments that meet that concern. The clause was designed to call forth capi-
tal, to reassure investors, and to provide credit at reasonable rates.158
These, actually, were the objectives of the Puerto Rican law that the
plaintiffs attacked. 159 Perhaps the unions could have wedged their claims
into the purpose of the clause by pointing out that public employees work
for present and future job security, and thus are a type of investors, but
this argument seems quite different from the intentions of the Founders.
The Automobile Workers court could also have followed the Allied-Blais-
dell criteria more faithfully by enumerating the five factors as those deci-
sions did, but coupling this approach with an analysis based on the
original intent of the Contract Clause would have further improved the
court's analysis.
151. See id. at 45-47.
152. Id. at 45.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See supra Part III.B.
156. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
157. See supra Part III.B.
158. See supra Part I; see also supra note 14 (citing Supreme Court recognition of these
purposes).
159. See supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
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B. NEW JERSEY RETAIL MERCHANTS ASSOCIATION v. SIDAMON-
ERISTOFF: DOES RETROACTIVE ESCHEAT OF UNCLAIMED
GIFr CARD BALANCES VIOLATE
THE CONTRACT CLAUSE?
In New Jersey Retail Merchants, the court held that retroactive escheat
of unclaimed balances in "stored value" cards, or gift cards, violated the
Contract Clause when it contradicted the agreements of issuers and card-
holders.160 The principal issue concerned unused gift cards, for which the
new law required issuers to pay over unclaimed cash to the state. 161 This
feature of the enactment meant that issuers had to turn over the value of
the gift certificates in cash, when they were originally bound to turn over
only merchandise or services to the owner. 162 Merchants thus lost income
that they otherwise would have earned, in the amount by which the cash
charged for their goods and services exceeded the cost of those goods and
services.163 In other words, they lost the profit that a merchant earns that
they had bargained for with customers.164
The court's analysis followed the Allied-Blaisdell pattern generally.
First, the court held that the impairment was "substantial," in response to
the threshold inquiry required by Allied.165 The court held that this stan-
dard required determination of "the legitimate expectations of the con-
tracting parties."166 Issuers "expected to realize a profit when the bearer
redeemed the card for the Issuers' merchandise or services."167 But re-
quiring issuers to turn over the entire abandoned cash balance "effec-
tively transfers their expected benefits to state custody."1 68 This
unexpected obligation substantially impaired the issuers' contract
rights.169
The court then considered the second stage of the Allied-Blaisdell in-
quiry.170 Although not a response to emergency, the state's enactment
did serve "a significant and legitimate public purpose" that was not nar-
rowly focused, because "[s]tate escheat law works to remedy the 'broad
and general social .. . problem' of reuniting abandoned property with its
owners."171 But the enactment was not appropriately limited or tailored,
as the Allied criteria had held that it must be. "Serving the State's public
purpose of reuniting abandoned property with owners did not require the
160. N.J. Retail Merch. Ass'n v. Sidamon-Eristoff, 669 F.3d 374, 382-83 (3d Cir. 2012).
161. Id. at 383-84.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 387.
164. Id. at 386-87.
165. Id. at 386.
166. Id. at 386 (quoting U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 19 n.17
(1977)).
167. Id. 386-87.
168. Id. at 387.
169. Id.
170. Id.




State to entirely deprive [card] Issuers of this bargained-for benefit." 172
Instead, "[1]ike many other states that escheat gift cards, New Jersey
could have accommodated the Issuers' expectations by requiring them to
turn over a percentage of the value of the abandoned gift card, reflecting
a discount based on the expected profit or merchant fee, rather than the
card's entire remaining value."173
A focus on the original intent underlying the Contract Clause would
have clarified the basis of the court's opinion. The court sensibly evalu-
ated the legitimate expectations of the contracting parties, but the court
did not indicate how this issue related to the constitutional provision. Un-
dermining the legitimate expectations of contracting parties brings about
the precise disadvantages that the Contract Clause was intended to avoid.
It defeats the policy of assuring investors of the benefit of their bargains
so as to call forth capital accumulation and provide for reasonable costs
of credit. 174 The court's holding and reasoning were generally consistent
with these purposes, but surer enforcement of the Contract Clause, as
well as avoidance of its misapplication, would follow from recognizing its
purposes.
V. CONCLUSION
The original intent underlying the Contract Clause emerges unmistaka-
bly from the constitutional history. The clause is an economic provision,
designed to protect investors. It is intended to encourage capital forma-
tion and avoid excessive costs of credit. It is not a protection of minority
rights as such, nor is it a guarantee of a general kind of fairness. In fact, a
fairness reading would minimize the effect of the clause by upholding
contract impairments that could somehow be defended, even arguably, as
fair. When an investor has succeeded in earning a significant return, it
may seem fair to shave part of that return away and give it to consumers
or the public generally, as the courts sometimes have done. But this kind
of fairness would undermine investor confidence. The Founders inferred
that such an approach would tend to discourage capital investment and
drive up costs of credit, and it was these effects that they intended to
prevent.
The Allied-Blaisdell criteria tend to serve this original intent of the
Founders, at least if the courts apply them rigorously. The Allied opinion,
in fact, supports its derivation of its two-step approach and its five sec-
ond-stage factors by explicitly citing the original purpose and molding its
standard to serve that purpose. In some of the decisions, however, the
courts have misapplied the Allied-Blaisdell criteria or have watered them
down.
The Contract Clause continues to arise in major litigation, often in con-
texts differing from those of earlier decisions that provide only ambigu-
172. Id. at 388.
173. Id.
174. See supra Part I.
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ous guidance, and consideration of the original intent would provide
more consistent results in these varying situations. Furthermore, an ex-
press recognition of the economic purpose of the Contract Clause, with
its policy of investor protection, would help the courts to apply the clause
according to its objective, while at the same time avoiding its application
to cases that it was not designed to fit.
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